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The theoretical foundation of risk pooling in insurance has heavily depend on the
independence assumption of losses, which is severely violated in crop insurance. A weaker
condition, asymptotic nonpositive correlation can also lead to risk pooling and is satisfied byyield
losses. Therefore, private insurance and reinsurance markets may work.1
THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRIVATE CROP INSURANCE MARKET:
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Introduction
In the wake of the historic 1996 farm legislation, mandating a decoupling of gradually diminishing
government support from agricultural commodity price levels, the need exists for more thoroughly
understanding the altered agricultural risk environment. Recent attention has focused on the potential role
infarmincomestabilizationoffederally-reinsuredcropandrevenueinsuranceprograms. Giventhehistory
of actuarial problems with federal crop insurance programs (Knight and Coble; Skees, Black and Barnett;
Goodwin and Smith; Wright) and the renewed interest among researchers and policy makers in modern
variants of crop insurance as an income stabilization tool, it is prudent to carefully review the theoretical
foundations of such insurance. The purpose of this paper is first to review these foundations; second to
consider a weaker statistical condition than the usually believed condition, independency, on the random
losses for effective risk pooling; and finally, in light of this condition, to briefly discuss the potential for a
privatized crop insurance market.
Theoretical Foundations of Insurance
The institution of insurance has evolved in modern economies as one means of risk shifting in the
face of uncertainty (Arrow, chapter 5). The primary function of insurance in this regard is risk pooling.
Mehr, Cammack and Rose (p.32) offer the following definition, “[i]nsurance maybe defined as a device for
reducingriskbycombiningasufficientnumberofexposureunitstomaketheirindividuallossescollectively
predictable.” In what follows, we will consider two different types of insurers’ risk, relative and absolute.
Wewillseethatthefirsttypeofriskisindeedgenerallydecreasedviacombiningorpoolingexposureunits,
but the second type is not. In pursuing this discussion we will consider the statistical foundations of
insurance first, drawing upon the illuminating framework provided by Cummins.














where SN is the total loss (claims) of the pool in a given period of time, Xi is the loss experienced by the i
th
exposure unit, and N is the number of exposure units in the pool. In the context of agricultural insurance,
an exposure unit may be a particular farm or parcel of land. In the model given by equation (1), each
individual loss is conceptualized as a random variable and the total loss experienced by the pool is random
as well. In an agricultural context, the loss is most likely defined as a production shortfall from some
prespecified level. If, for convenience, we assume the loss distributions of all exposure units are identical
with mean µ and variance σ
2, the expected total loss of the pool is:
and the variance of the total loss of the pool is:
where ρij is the correlation between the i
th and j
th exposure units.
To be of much use, additional information regarding the distribution of the Xi’s must be included
inthemodel. ElementarydiscussionsofriskpoolingoftenassumetheXi’sareindependentlyandidentically
distributed (i.i.d.). While this set of distributional assumptions allow application of the simplest version of
a law of large numbers, it is unnecessarily strong and generally not realistic (Bühlmann). Identically
distributed exposure units may generally be desirable, but this condition is by no means a necessary
statistical condition for effective pooling. Cummins contends that a more compelling argument for
homogeneity as a necessary condition for insurability involves information asymmetries between insurers




Pr[G¯ xNµG<ε]  1 ºε>0 (4)
Similarly, independence is not a necessary condition for the application of more general forms of
laws of large numbers and thus for potentially effective risk pooling. In this initial stage of our discussion,
however, we shall begin with the simplest case, i.i.d. losses, which simplifies equation (3) since ρij =0f o r
all i £ j. We will then present the more realistic case, especially in the context of agricultural insurance, in
which we assume neither identical (except for notational convenience) nor independent random losses. A
particular form of statistical dependency needs, then, be assumed.
The collection of theorems known as the Weak Law of Large Numbers (WLLN) stands as one of
the fundamental propositions of the theoryof probability,andas such provides the statistical foundation for
the critical function of risk pooling. As Bühlman (p.33) explains “[i]t is due to the convergence of the
average claimtoward a fixed quantity that we can expect--for large numbers--to offset the effects of chance
(claim amounts) by fixed quantities (premiums).” We first consider the most basic WLLN result:
WeakLawofLargeNumbers(i.i.d.randomvariables). Let beasequenceofindependently {Xi}
N
i￿1
and identically distributed random variables, and suppose the expected value of Xi is finite for all i
(EXi =µ<Q, º i). Then the following holds
where
1





Within the insurance context, this WLLN result states that if we assume all random losses in the
insurancepoolareindependentandidenticallydistributed,theaveragelossrealizedwillbearbitrarilyclose
to the true mean of the common loss distribution with probability approaching 1 as the size of the pool
approaches infinity. It would then seem that if the true mean of the loss function could be accurately
estimated from past loss experience; beginning each insurance period this amount (the net premium) could






xiNµG<ε]  1 ºε>0 , (5)
Pr[G¯ xNµG<kσ/ N] A 11/k 2 ºk>0 , (6)
pay any realized indemnities. This is essentially what risk pooling is all about, although as we shall see
immediately below (equation (5)) it is not the whole story.
Equation (4) is the most basic result of the WLLN. The same type of convergence, however, will
occur under more general conditions than i.i.d. randomvariables. Asufficient condition for the basic result
of the law to hold is that the variance of goes to 0 as N goes to infinity (Mittelhammer, p. 262). WLLN ¯ XN
has important implications for the behavior of an insurer’s relative risk as well as for the determining of
actuarially sound premiums. These implications, as well as the more general results alluded to above, will
be discussed below.
Cummins stresses that the result of the WLLN does not imply the following
i.e.,theprobabilitythatthetotalrandomlossofthepoolbecomesarbitrarilyclosetoitsexpectedvalue,Nµ,
does not converge to 1 as the insurance pool grows large. This observation is the other side of the risk
pooling story and is important to the understanding of insurers’ absolute risk and the need for insurance
buffer funds and risk loading of premiums.
While the WLLN is an important theoretical result, it is of more practical interest to consider
insurance pools with a finite number of members. Assuming i.i.d. random losses, implying
we can use Chebyshev’s Inequality to write the following bound ¯ XN J (µ,σ2/N),
i.e.,alowerboundof1-1/k
2existsontheprobabilitythattherealizedaveragelosswillfallintheinterval(µkσ/ N,µ kσ/ N).
Forsomechoice of k, which makes the lower bound on the probabilitygiven in (6) as close to 1 as we wish,
the width of this “confidence” interval is determined by the standard deviation of the distribution of σ/ N5




xiNµG<kσ N] A 11/k 2, ºk>0 . (8)
IAR  σ N (9)
averageloss. ThistypeofreasoningleadsCumminstosuggestthefollowingmeasureofaninsurer’srelative
risk (IRR)
or, simply, the standard error of the average loss. This type of insurer’s risk, i.e., the risk that the realized
average loss will be far from the mean of the loss distribution, decreases as the size of the insurance pool
increases.
To define the concept of absolute risk, multiply the probability inequality in (6) by N, yielding
In this case, we see that the width of the interval which contains the realized total loss sN ,
i.e., with a probability as close to 1 as we wish (depending upon our choice (Nµkσ N, Nµkσ N),
of k) depends upon As a consequence of (8), Cummins suggests the following definition of an σ N.
insurer’s absolute risk (IAR)
i.e., the standard deviation of total loss of the pool. From (8), it is apparent that the probable deviation of
thetotallossofthepoolfromitsexpectedvaluebecomesincreasinglylargeastheinsurancepoolincreases,
a condition captured by the concept of absolute risk.
It is imprecise to claim, common in the insurance literature, that risk becomes negligible in large
insurance pools. From our discussion above, we see that risk is reduced in large pools in the relative sense
but not in the absolute sense. This distinction between types of risk is important to the concept of a buffer




xiNµ) σ N < yα  Pr[(sNNµ)<yασ N]  1α , (10)
In the insurance literature, the event of an aggregate loss occurring (a realization of SN)w h i c hi ss o
large as to deplete the insurance fund is captured by the concept of ruin. It has been suggested in the
literature that a possible objective criterion for the management of an insurance pool is to minimize the
probability of ruin in a given time period or perhaps maximize returns subject to maintaining a specified
probability of ruin (Bühlmann). The premium surplus above the expected value of the aggregate loss (Nµ
under homogeneity) required to maintain a particular probability of ruin is referred to as the buffer fund.
Central limit theory, while limited in its practical relevance given the highly skewed loss distributions
typicallyencounteredininsuranceproblems,isusefulinillustratingtheconceptofabufferfund(Cummins).
Assuming i.i.d. random losses and that the approximation implied by the Lindberg-Levy Central
Limit Theorem (Mittelhammer, p.270) is sufficiently precise, we can write
where yα is a real number such that φ(yα)=1-α,a n dφ is the standard normal distribution function. Thus
to avoid ruin with probability1 -α, the insurance fund must have a liquid buffer fund of the size yασ N .
The buffer fund is therefore a function of absolute risk and grows with the size of the pool. However, the
buffer fund required per exposure unit, is a function of relative risk and declines with the size of yασ/ N,
the pool. Another way to view this is that since the size of the buffer fund is proportional to the square root
of N; as the size of the pool grows, the buffer fund amount allocated to each policy (buffer load) decreases.
Premium rate setting is approached in various ways in the insurance literature, but the discussion
generally begins with the concept of “pure” or “net” premium (Hogg and Klugman; Borch; Goodwin and
Smith). The net premium is simply the expected indemnity per exposure unit. The gross premium, the
amount paid by the insured per exposure unit in order to be eligible for coverage, is larger than the net7
P  PN  A  L, (11)
premium by an amount referred to as the loading factor. We can examine the components of the loading
factor by decomposing the gross premium in the following manner
where P is the gross premium, PN is the net premium, A is an administrative cost load, and L is the buffer
load. An additional loading component to offset the risk of inaccurately estimating PN might also be
included in some instances. Assuming identically distributed losses and that there is no deductible or cap
on the maximum indemnity, then it is clear that the expected indemnity equals the expected loss, i.e., PN =
µ.
The amount by which the gross premium exceeds the net premium (A+L ) is essentially a “risk
premium”, and as such is an extremely important determinant of the demand for insurance. If A+Lwere
equal to zero, leaving P = PN then a risk neutral insured would be indifferent between paying the gross
premiumor facingthe riskof loss. Since in practical applicationsA+Lissomepositive amount, and hence
P > PN it is generally assumed that the purchase of insurance is explained by risk aversion (Goodwin and
Smith).
If we assume economies of scale in the administration function, then the administrative cost per
exposure unit, A, will decline as the size of the insurance pool grows. Furthermore under the conditions
above(i.i.d.randomlosses),thebufferloadperexposureunit, willdeclineasthesizeofthe L  yασ/ N,
poolincreases. Thus for a sufficientlylarge insurance pool, the amount A+Lwill not be large, i.e., the risk
premiuma risk averse insured must pay to obtain coverage will be small. Under these conditions we would
expect the insurance market to be viable.
From our discussion heretofore, it is apparent that the critical ingredient for risk pooling is that the
varianceoftheaveragelossdiminishesasthesizeoftheinsurancepoolincreases. Underthisbasiccondition
relative riskdecreases as the size of the pool increases thus providinga statistical basis for predictingfuture8
cov(Xi,Xi￿t) @ atσiσi￿t ºt>0 . (12)
losses. Furthermoreunderthiscondition,thebufferloadalsodeclinesasthepoolgrowslarger,thusensuring
(assuming economies of scale in administration) that the gross premium will exceed the actuarially fair net
premium by a relatively small amount. At this point we might ask ourselves what minimal conditions are
required of the random losses to ensure ? Certainly i.i.d. random losses assures var( ¯ XN) S 0 as N SQ
this; but, doweaker (more inclusive) conditions exist? The answer is yes. The section below examines one
such condition, asymptotic nonpositive correlation, which has some intuitive appeal in the agricultural
context.
A Generalization: Asymptotic Nonpositive Correlation
Inwhatfollowswewillexplicitlyrelaxtheassumptionofindependence. Giventherelianceofcrop
yields on large scale weather patterns, the assumption of independently distributed losses is particularly
tenuous in the present context. In place of the independence assumption we will assume asymptotic
nonpositive correlation (a.n.c.). Mittelhammer (p. 266) defines an a.n.c. random sequence as follows:












The two conditions, at M [0,1] º t and imply that The at’s represent ˆ
Q
t￿1
at < Q, an S 0 as n SQ .
upper bounds to the correlations between Xi and Xi+t. The definition implies that Xi and Xi+t cannot be
positivelycorrelatedwhen Inthecontext ofcropinsurance,thenatural waytoorderexposureunits t SQ .
inasequenceisspatiallysothattrepresentsanordinalmeasureofphysicaldistancebetweenexposureunits.
The concept of a.n.c. seems quite sensible when applied to crop losses in an agricultural context.
Under this assumption, for example, the correlation between the losses of two fields 500 miles apart will
generally be less positive than the correlation between two adjacent fields. The definition places no lower
bound on the amount of negative correlation between the losses of any two exposure units; although these
are likely rare and thus largely irrelevant.9


































Pr[G¯ xN¯ µNG<ε]  1 ºε>0 (15)
Assumingidenticallydistributed losses for notational convenience, the variance of theaverageloss
in the pool may be written
where the Xi are ordered spatially and t represents an ordinal measure of physical distance. If we assume
that losses are a.n.c. then using the relationship given in equation (12) we can place the following bound on
the variance





definitionofa.n.c.,thenweseethat Asmentionedabove,thatthevarianceof var( ¯ XN) S 0 as N SQ . ¯ X
collapses as N goes to infinity is a sufficient condition for a WLLN result to obtain (see Mittelhammer,
Theorem 5.22). If we relax the notationally convenient assumption of identically distributed losses, then
under these conditions we would still obtain the following WLLN result
whichisidenticaltotheoneinequation(4)exceptinsofarasµ hasbeenreplacedby themean ¯ µN  E( ¯ XN),
of the associated sequence of expected values.
Using arguments similar to those used above, we see that under conditions of a.n.c. an insurer’s





















N 2 . (17)
insurancepoolgrows. Similarly,theinsurer’sabsoluteriskwillincreaseasthesizeofthepoolexpands;but
the buffer load needed to counter this risk will decrease with pool size.
The Potential for a Private Crop Insurance Market
Nowitisusuallybelievedthatprivatemarketforcropinsurancewillnotworkbecausetheindemnity
is not independent. A leading article by Miranda and Glauber concludes that the major reason of crop
insurance market failure is systematic risk, the dependency (positive correlation) of farm yield loss. Their
measure of systematic risk is defined by the ratio of the coefficient of variation of total indemnities paid to
the coefficient of variation if indemnity payments were independent as:
The high ratio calculated from the crop insurance industry leads them to this conclusion.
It should be noted that first, this measure of systematic risk is in the sense of absolute risk; second,
the systemic risk is bounded as the number of insureds increases; and third even if the systemic risk is still
much higher than 1 after pooling a large number of insureds, the total risk faced by the insurer should
decrease under a.n.c which can be seen by the coefficient of variation itself (in either absolute or relative
sense):
We have demonstrated above that the critical statistical condition determining the viability of an
insurance pool is the behavior of relative risk as the insurance pool grows and not the behavior of absolute
risk. Fromtheirwork,althoughapositivecontributiontotheliterature,wecannotconcludethataprivatized
crop insurance market is doomed to fail.2The authors are aware of the turbulence experienced by the property insurance market
particularly in recent years (see Lewis and Murdock), and don’t intend to argue that the effect of












as the pool size grows as compared to the ideal case of i.i.d. random losses. The speed of convergence of
relative risk to zero will in turn be determined by how quickly the sequence of bounds on the correlations
between losses, i.e., converges to zero. This is essentially an empirical question and may have {ai}
N
i￿1,
important implications for the actuarial soundness of crop insurance programs and for the optimal trading
of risk in a reinsurance market.
Comparing to the case of property insurance, in which losses are also correlated due to natural
hazards such as hurricanes
2, we might expect the existence of a private agricultural reinsurance market in
which risks are traded at the national and/or international level at which yield losses for various crops and
regions are hardly correlated.
Since yield losses can be assumed independent (or near independent) across time, yield risks might
also be pooled over time through cumulating premium surplus, and/or multi year contracts. Suppose the
coefficientofvariationin(17)isforoneyear,andthenthecoefficientofvariationforTyearswillbesmaller
as:
Trading in an options or futures market will further facilitate the reinsurance market, such a futures market
for crop yields have been available in Chicago Board of Trade since recently.
Conclusion
We have reviewed the statistical foundations of insurance in this article, and demonstrated that a
necessary condition for effective risk pooling is not the loss independency, but a weaker condition,12
asymptotically nonpositive correlation. The later condition may be satisfied in case of agricultural
production, which implies the possibility of private agricultural insurance markets. Our contention is not
that the effect of government intervention is necessarily negative, but that the possibility of a private
agricultural insurance and reinsurance market is not precluded by the statistical nature of agricultural
production, and this possibility should not be dismissed out of hand.REFERENCES
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